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1  Introduction
It has been said that the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
in Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Brummeria Renaissance 
(Pty) Ltd is the most important tax case decided in the past 30 years. The 
case has far-reaching consequences for the many retirement village develop-
ers who financed the construction of units in retirement villages by obtaining 
interest-free loans from retirees in return for granting occupation rights in 
respect of these units. Questions have also been raised regarding the possible 
application of the decision to other interest-free loans and even other areas of 
taxation law.
The case deals with the question whether a borrower of money under an 
interest-free loan can be taxed on the “benefit” of not having to pay interest. 
This paper argues that this question should be answered in the negative, since 
the borrower does not acquire property and no amount accordingly accrues 
to or is received by her, as required by the definition of “gross income”.
At the outset, a short summary of the facts in Brummeria will be provided, 
followed by the definition of “gross income”. The meaning of a number of 
concepts that are central to this definition, namely “received by”, “accrued 
to” and “amount” will then be considered. It will be argued that the concept 
“accrued to” requires an acquisition of a right by the taxpayer. It will also 
be argued that the concept of “amount” requires the existence of property. 
Thereafter, regard will be had to the concept of “property”, and specifically 
 Also cited as [007] SCA 99 (RSA); 69 SATC 05; [007] 4 All SA 338 (SCA)  The judgement was 
delivered by Cloete JA  Scott and Van Heerden JJA and Kgomo and Mhlantla AJJA concurred
 For example Visser “Duister Heers oor Belasbaarheid van Rentevrye Lenings” Sake24 (5/09/007) 
available at www news4 com/Sake/Rubrieke/0,,6-03_89846,00 html (accessed 6 November 007) 
and Visser “Staat Moet Ingryp Teen dié Leningstaks” Sake24 (7/09/007) available at www news4
com/Sake/Algemene_nuus/0,,6-607_8503,00 html (accessed 6 November 007)
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those property rights that usually flow from a monetary loan. Finally, an 
answer to the question whether the “right to retain and use loan capital inter-
est-free” is property that accrues to or is received by the borrower will be 
sought.
2  Facts in Brummeria
The taxpayers were three companies, each conducting the business of devel-
oping retirement villages. This entailed that the taxpayer companies entered 
into written contracts with potential occupants of units to be constructed in 
the retirement villages. In terms of these contracts, a potential occupant would 
make a monetary loan to a particular taxpayer company in order to finance the 
construction of a unit in a retirement village by that taxpayer company. The 
relevant taxpayer company then issued a debenture to the lender/retiree in 
acknowledgement of the loan, endorsed the title deeds of the relevant unit and 
registered a covering bond as further security in favour of the lender/retiree.
The loan did not bear interest.3 As counter-performance for the granting of the 
loan, the taxpayer companies granted the right of lifelong occupation of the rel-
evant unit to the lender/retiree, but ownership remained with the relevant taxpayer 
company. The taxpayer company was obliged to repay the loan to the lender/reti-
ree upon cancellation of the contract, or upon the lender/retiree’s death.4
The Commissioner included amounts representing the “benefit of the rights 
to interest-free loans” in the gross income of the taxpayer companies for a 
number of years of assessment. These amounts were determined by apply-
ing the weighted prime overdraft rate for banks to the average amount of the 
particular interest-free loan in the relevant year of assessment.5
The taxpayer companies raised two grounds in their statement of grounds of 
appeal. The only one relevant to this discussion6 is the argument that the inter-
3 It is questionable whether the loans were, indeed, “interest-free”, although this was not raised by the 
taxpayers as a ground of appeal and was thus not addressed by the Tax Court or SCA in their respective 
judgements  On the one hand the standard loan contract referred to the loan as “rentevry”, but on the 
other hand it specifically indicated that the loan was made as a counter-performance for the granting of 
the life-long right to occupy the unit  See para 3 of ITC 1791 67 SATC 230 (“the Tax Court judgement”) 
for abstracts of the terms of the standard loan contract  A possibility discussed by Prof Van Wyk during 
a SAFA seminar held at Century City on 0 November 007 is that the contract between the taxpayer 
companies and the retirees was a pactum antichreseos  Such a pactum gives a mortgagee (in this case the 
retiree) the right to use the mortgaged property in lieu of interest on the loan capital  See “Mortgage and 
Pledge” LAWSA XVII para 477
4 There is some uncertainty as to whether the obligation to repay the loan was unconditional  The standard 
contract concluded between the respective taxpayer companies and the lenders/retirees is not reproduced 
in its entirety in either the Tax Court or SCA judgement  According to clause 8 4 of the contract (cited 
at para 3 of the Tax Court judgement) repayment of the loan was subject to “voorwaardes” contained in 
another clause, the latter clause not being reproduced in the judgement  With no further information, it 
must be assumed (as it apparently was by the Tax Court and the SCA) that the obligation to repay was 
unconditional
5 Paras  and 4 of the Commissioner’s statement of the grounds of assessment, quoted at para 5 of the 
SCA judgement  The valuation method was never challenged by the taxpayer companies and was accepted 
by the SCA without consideration  Since the Tax Court found in favour of the taxpayers on the ground 
that no amount was received by or accrued to the taxpayer companies, the valuation method was never 
considered by the Tax Court either  For criticism on the valuation method used by the Commissioner, 
see Cilliers “Brummeria Renaissance: The Interest Free Cat among the Borrower Pigeons” 2007 The 
Taxpayer 84 86 – 87  
6 The other ground dealt with an administrative issue
est-free loans did not result in any amounts having accrued to or being received 
by the taxpayers as contemplated in the definition of “gross income”.7
The case was initially heard by Goldblatt J at the Johannesburg Tax Court,8 
who found in favour of the taxpayer companies on this ground. Goldblatt J 
subsequently granted the Commissioner leave to appeal to the SCA in terms 
of section 36A(5) of the Income Tax Act9. Goldblatt J’s decision was subse-
quently overturned in favour of the Commissioner.0
3  Definition of “gross income”
In light of the Commissioner’s argument that the “benefit of the rights to 
interest-free loans” formed part of the “gross income” of the taxpayer compa-
nies, this definition requires consideration. At the time the definition of “gross 
income” read as follows:
“… the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or accrued to ... [the taxpayer] during such year 
or period of assessment … excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature…”
The concepts “received by”, “accrued to”, and “amount” are considered in 
more detail below.
4  Meaning of “received by” and “accrued to”
4 1 The realisation principle
It is a well established principle of our income tax law that, in order to 
constitute “gross income”, some or other form of realisation must first take 
place. This requirement is explained by Professor Ross Parsons, a well-known 
Australian authority on tax, in the following manner:3
“There must be a gain which has a source in an obligation undertaken by another, or in a payment of 
money or transfer of property by another.”4
This requirement was recognised by our courts as early as in ITC 1105. 
In that case a speculative builder completed a house for sale in one year of 
assessment and sold it in the next. The taxpayer’s contention that it ought to 
7 An argument that the “amounts” were of a capital nature and thus not “gross income” was not properly 
raised as a ground of appeal and thus not considered by the SCA  Refer to para 0 of the SCA judgement  
It is assumed throughout this paper that the benefit in question was of a non-capital nature
8 ITC 1791 67 SATC 30
9 Act 58 of 96
0 Although the SCA found in favour of one of the taxpayers in respect of the administrative ground of 
appeal
 S  of the Income Tax Act 58 of 96  Although the definition has since been amended, the amendments 
are not relevant to this discussion
 emphasis added
3 Parsons Income Taxation in Australia: Principles of Income, Deductibility and Tax Accounting (985) 
para  8 available at http://purl library usyd edu au/setis/id/p00086 (accessed 6 November 007)  Refer 
also to the classic definition of income in Commissioner v Glenshaw Glass Co (955) 348 uS 46 as 
“instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realised, and over which the taxpayers have com-
plete dominion”  Emphasis added
4 emphasis added
5 4 SATC 59
36 STeLL LR 008 
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be taxed on some of the profits in the first year was rejected by the court on the 
ground that the taxpayer had not realised any of the profits in that first year.6
The realisation requirement is expressed by the words “received by or 
accrued to” in the definition of “gross income”.
4 2 Meaning of “received by”
A taxpayer “receives” income if she obtains physical control7 over money 
or money’s worth.8 Clearly, however, not every such instance will be regarded 
as a receipt for purposes of the definition of “gross income”.9 Rather, this will 
only be the case if the taxpayer receives the money or money’s worth on her 
own behalf for her own benefit.0
4 3 Meaning of “accrued to”
The meaning of the concept “accrued to” was settled in Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd. On the facts, the 
taxpayer had an unconditional right to receive payment in future. The Court 
held that “accrued to” means to become entitled to an amount (here the right 
to payment); in other words, to acquire an (unconditional) right. In defining 
“accrued to” in this manner, our courts have created a link between the con-
cepts of “accrued to” and “amount”, as explained in more detail below.
5  Meaning of “amount”
When ascribing meaning to the word “amount” in the context of “gross 
income” two questions arise. The first question deals with whether an 
“amount” refers only to receipts that can be turned into money by the tax-
payer, or to all receipts that have an objective monetary value. This question 
was the main issue considered by the SCA in Brummeria, where the latter 
meaning was ultimately favoured. The second question is which kinds of 
accruals or receipts constitute “amounts”. This entails an inquiry into whether 
an “amount” includes only receipts or accruals that are property, or rather all 
benefits (irrespective of whether or not they are property). This paper does 
not deal with the first question in any detail. Instead, it focuses on the second 
6 See also Land Dealing Co v CoT 959 3 SA 485 (SR) 496 where Beadle J held, with reference to s 8 of 
the Rhodesian Income Tax Act 6 of 954 (which has a similar definition of “gross income) that “gross 
income” did not include a so-called “notional receipt” or “notional accrual”  
7 Physical control is arguably not always required  If, for example, payment is made by way of electronic 
transfer, the payee will, for purposes of the definition of “gross income” “receive” the amount transferred, 
even though she did not get “physical control” over a thing
8 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 955 3 SA 93 (A) 30  In ITC 1789 67 SATC 
05 08 Levinsohn J defined “receive” as “the physical act of taking possession of the amounts paid”  In 
Commissioner of Taxes v G 43 SATC 159 the word “received” in the definition of “gross income” in s 8(1) 
of the Rhodesian Income Tax Act was defined, with reference to the Short Oxfort Dictionary, as “[t]o take 
into one’s hands, or into one’s possession (something held out or offered by another); to take delivery of 
(a thing) from another … for oneself…”
9 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 955 3 SA 93 (A) 30
0 Geldenhuys v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 947 3 SA 56 (C) 66
 990  SA 353 (A) 363I-364C
 See 5  below
question. However, these two questions are not unrelated and brief reference 
will thus also be made the first question.3
5 1 Only receipts and accruals of property are “amounts”
In WH Lategan v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,4 the taxpayer sold 
wine in one year of assessment, but payment was only due in the follow-
ing year of assessment. The Court held that the right to receive payment was 
property to which the taxpayer became entitled in the first year of assessment 
and that this was an amount that had accrued to the taxpayer. In reaching his 
decision, Watermeyer J held as follows:5
“In his Lordship’s opinion the word ‘amount’ had to be given a wider meaning and must include not 
only money but the value of every form of property earned by the taxpayer whether corporeal or 
incorporeal which has a money value.”6
Lategan’s definition of an “amount” as “any form of property” was accepted 
in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) 
Ltd.7 In the latter case, an “amount” was also defined as any “rights” with 
monetary value of a non-capital nature.8 The definition in People’s Stores 
was in turn accepted in Cactus Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue.9 The definitions in Lategan and People’s Store were also 
both quoted with approval by the SCA in Brummeria.30
Despite the general acceptance of Lategan’s definition of an “amount” as 
“any form of property”, the question as to whether a receipt or accrual consti-
tutes property (and thus “gross income”) has seldom been directly considered 
by our courts.
An exception is the judgement in Stander v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue.3 In that case the taxpayer received an overseas trip as a prize and 
the Commissioner sought to include the value of the prize in his taxable 
income. The prize was awarded by Delta Motor Corporation (Pty) Ltd, which 
was not Stander’s employer. Friedman JP found that no property accrued to 
the taxpayer before he went on the overseas trip by virtue of provisions of the 
General Law Amendment Act.3 The gift could thus, before he had gone on 
the trip, not have been an amount.33
unfortunately, our courts have not always exercised due care in their use of 
the relevant terminology. For example, in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v 
Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd34 Feetham JA held that all the lessor’s “benefits” with 
3 See 5 3 below
4 96 CPD 03
5 07
6 emphasis added
7 990  SA 353 (A) 363I-364C
8 365A
9 999  SA 35 (SCA) 39G-H
30 Paras  and 6 of the SCA judgement
3 997 3 SA 67 (C)  Friedman JP also held that no property accrued to the taxpayer at a later stage for the 
reasons given in 5 3 below
3 S 5 of Act 50 of 956
33 Stander v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 997 3 SA 67 (C) 6D-H
34 1945 AD 301  The issue in the case was whether an “amount” was received by or accrued to the taxpayer 
as a premium or like consideration in respect of the grant of a right for the use or occupation of premises 
under s 7()(d) of Act 40 of 95
38 STeLL LR 008 
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an ascertainable money value would constitute an amount.35 However, on the 
facts, the lessor’s “benefits” were contractual rights that arose in terms of a 
lease contract and were thus in any event property in the form of personal 
rights. Furthermore, in light of the acceptance by Feetham JA of the principle 
in Lategan’s case that only receipts and accruals with ascertainable monetary 
value could institute “gross income”, it seems unlikely that, had he contem-
plated a wider meaning of the word “amount” (which would also include 
benefits other than property), he would not have expressly stated so.
The concepts of “amount” and “accrued to” are linked in that both require 
the existence of a subjective right as represented by the concept of property. 
As explained above,36 it has been held that an accrual can only take place if a 
taxpayer acquires a right: if the taxpayer acquires, for example, a mere spes, 
there is neither an accrual nor an amount, for the reasons set out above.
This link is illustrated by the decision of Jansen J in ITC 1810.37 In that 
case, the taxpayer invested money at interest with a certain A under a pyramid 
scheme. Soon afterwards, A became insolvent without ever having paid any 
interest to the taxpayer. Jansen J had to decide whether any interest that could 
constitute gross income in the hands of the taxpayer had accrued to him. He 
referred to Fourie NO and Others v Edeling NO and Others,38 where it was 
decided that a “promise” to pay returns under a pyramid scheme was a nul-
lity.39 He thus held that, since the taxpayer never had an (unconditional)40 
right to claim interest from A, the interest did not accrue to the taxpayer.4 
Similarly, it can be said that the taxpayer did not acquire an amount.
Based on the repeated acceptance by the SCA of Lategan’s definition of 
“amount” as “any form of property,” it can be concluded that only accruals 
and receipts in the form of property will constitute an amount for purposes of 
“gross income”.
5 2 Meaning of “property”
“Property” is not easily defined under modern South African law. The 
meaning of the word differs considerably depending on the context in which it 
is used.4 In South African law, a person’s “property” is traditionally defined 
with reference to the subjective rights which that person holds.43 A subjective 
right is a claim that a person (a legal subject) has to a legal object as against 
other persons.44 Four, or possibly five, subjective rights are recognised: real 
35 3
36 See 4  above
37 68 SATC 89
38 [005] 4 All SA 393 (SCA) para 9
39 Presumably this means that no obligations arise under such “promise”
40 Although Jansen J held that the taxpayer never had an “unconditional right” to payment of the interest, it 
is arguable that he never had any contractual right, unconditional or otherwise, in light of n 39 above  The 
possibility of a claim based on unjustified enrichment is not considered
4 9  See n 39 above
4 See Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (006) Ch  for 
the different contexts in which the word is often used
43 “Things” LAWSA XXVII para 95
44 Badenhorst et al Property 9; Van der Vyver “The Doctrine of Private-Law Rights” in Strauss (ed) 
Huldigingsbundel vir WA Joubert (988) 0 4; Du Plessis An Introduction to Law 3 ed (999) 45
rights, personal rights, immaterial property rights, personality rights and, 
possibly, personal immaterial property rights. The first two are particularly 
important to this paper and are discussed in more detail below.
The respective legal objects to which these subjective rights relate are:45 things 
(the legal object of real rights), performances46 (the legal object of personal 
rights), aspects of a natural person’s personality (the legal object of personality 
rights), immaterial property (the object of immaterial property rights) and per-
sonal immaterial property (the object of personal immaterial property rights).
It is usually accepted that an object must have value in order to qualify as 
a legal object. This entails that the object has to satisfy some or other need 
of a legal subject.47 Legal objects can thus have patrimonial value (in other 
words economic or material value) or mere sentimental (non-patrimonial) 
value.48 This distinction is particularly important in seeking to elucidate the 
meaning of “property”, since it is usually only those legal objects (with their 
corresponding subjective rights) with patrimonial value that are regarded as 
“property”.49 It follows that personality rights are generally not regarded as 
“property”, since the legal objects of these rights (being aspects of a natural 
person’s personality, such as a person’s dignity) do not have patrimonial value. 
However, there is support for the view that things50 and performances5 do not 
in all instances have patrimonial value.
The word “right(s)” is not consistently used to refer to a person’s subjective 
rights.5 It is, for example, sometimes also used in order to refer to the powers 
or entitlements that the holder of a subjective right has to deal with a legal 
object by virtue of that right.
Take as example the “right” of an owner of a house to occupy the house. 
Ownership of the house is a subjective right (a real right). This right entails 
that the owner may do certain things with the house, such as use it, destroy it, 
possess it and dispose of it.53 Put differently, these are entitlements which refer 
to how the holder of the right of ownership is legally entitled to deal with the 
house within the confines of her right of ownership.54 The entitlements of the 
holder of a subjective right will differ depending on the kind of subjective right 
that she holds. For example, a landlord (who is also the owner of a house) has 
the entitlement to dispose of the house, whereas a lessee who leases that house 
does not.
45 Badenhorst et al Property 3; Du Plessis Introduction 4 – 43 and 46 – 50
46 There is also a (less common) view that the object of a personal right is not the performance by the debtor, 
but the economic aspect of the debtor  Refer in this regard to Van der Vyver “Private-Law Rights” in 
Huldigingsbundel 30
47 Du Plessis Introduction 44
48 50
49 Badenhorst et al Property 9 and 4; LAWSA XXVII para 195; “Obligations” LAWSA XIX para 0
50 Van der Merwe Sakereg  ed (989) 7; Badenhorst et al Property ; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction 
to the Law of Property 5 ed (006) 5
5 De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg I 5 ed (99) ; Van der Merwe, 
Van Huyssteen, Reinecke & Lubbe Contract: General Principles 3 ed (006) 3
5 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Kirsch 1978 3 SA 93 (T) 94; Van der Vyver “Private-Law Rights” in 
Huldigingsbundel 5; Du Plessis Introduction 36 – 37
53 Badenhorst et al Property 93; Du Plessis Introduction 46
54 Van der Vyver “Private-Law Rights” in Huldigingsbundel 7
40 STeLL LR 008 
BRuMMeRIA ReNAISSANCe 4
5 2 1 Real rights as “property”
A “real right” is a right to a thing, which is in turn defined as an independent 
corporeal object susceptible to legal control. The object must be valuable and 
useful to a person.55 examples of real rights are ownership and the rights of 
a pledgee in respect of the pledged thing. It is uncertain under South African 
law whether mere possession of a thing is a real right.56 Suffice it to say that 
possession is often one of the entitlements that flows from (other) rights. It is 
thus an entitlement flowing from inter alia an owner’s real right of ownership 
or from a lessee’s personal right in terms of a contract of lease.57
5 2 2 Personal rights as “property”
Personal rights58 are a person’s rights to a performance, which is “an act in 
the form of delivering something, doing or not doing something (dare, facere 
or non facere) which one person can require a particular other person to per-
form”.59 One of the sources of personal rights is contract.60 upon conclusion 
of a valid contract, one or more obligations arises. each such obligation is 
comprised of a passive side (being the duty of the one party, the debtor, to 
perform) and an active side (being the personal right of the other party, the 
creditor,6 to the performance).6
5 3 Meaning of “property” in respect of “gross income”
Once it is accepted that only property can be an amount for purposes of the 
definition of “gross income”, the next question that warrants consideration 
is what is meant by “property” in the context of income tax. As explained 
earlier, the word has a different meaning depending on the context in which 
it is used.
In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe,63 Watermeyer CJ said 
the following in respect of “property” for purposes of estate duty:
“One would expect that when the estate of a person is described as consisting of property, what is 
meant by property is all rights vested in him which have a pecuniary or economic value. Such rights 
can conveniently be referred to as proprietary rights and they include jura in rem, real rights, such 
55 See 5  above regarding what this requirement entails
56 For a short discussion of this debate, see Badenhorst et al Property 73 – 75 and Van der Merwe Sakereg 
91-92  See also Van der Vyver “Private-Law Rights” in Huldigingsbundel 6, who does not regard pos-
session as a real right, but as an entitlement, and notes that the right to claim possession could be a 
personal right
57 Van der Merwe Sakereg 
58 Also “creditors’ rights”  See Van der Vyver “Private-Law Rights” in Huldigingsbundel 3 on the differ-
ent terminology
59 Badenhorst et al Property 3  Refer also Van der Merwe et al Contract -3; De Wet & Van Wyk 
Kontraktereg 
60 Van der Merwe et al Contract 5-6  For a discussion of what is meant by a “contract”, see Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 8-9
6 There may, of course, be multiple creditors and/or debtors
6 Oertel v Direkteur van Plaaslike Bestuur 983  SA 354 (A) 370; Van der Merwe et al Contract -3; 
LAWSA XIX para 8
63 943 AD 656
as rights of ownership in both immovable and movable property, and also jura in personam such as 
debts and rights of action.”64
This definition of “property” thus echos the traditional view of property as 
a person’s subjective patrimonial rights.
In Stander’s case,65 Friedman JP, after finding that this statement applies to 
all fiscal legislation, limited “property” in the context of income tax to limited 
“rights which have a monetary value in the hands of the holder”.66 The Court 
thus held that if a taxpayer becomes entitled to a right which she cannot turn 
into money, that right does not constitute “property” and is thus not “gross 
income”. However, this limitation was rejected by Cloete JA in Brummeria.67
Based on the authority cited above, it can be argued that “property” in 
the limitation context of income tax legislation bears its traditional meaning, 
namely subjective rights with (objective) patrimonial value.
6  Loan for consumption
The nature of a monetary loan and, specifically, the subjective rights that 
arise in terms of such a contract, now has to be considered.
A contract for lending money is a loan for consumption or mutuum, which 
entails the delivery of units of a fungible thing to the borrower, who becomes 
the owner of those units, and is obliged to return the same number of units of 
the type of thing that was borrowed, after the lapse of time.68
The South African loan for consumption has its roots in Roman law, where 
the contract of mutuum was regarded as a real contract.69 This meant that a 
pactum de mutuo dando (an agreement to lend) was not enforceable on its own. 
It was only once datio– transfer of ownership of the borrowed object(s) to the 
borrower– had taken place, that the contract of mutuum became enforceable. In 
light of this, mutuum gave rise to only one obligation, namely the obligation to 
return objects of the same kind, quantity and quality at expiry of the loan.70
Initially, mutuum was used for short-term loans between friends and there was 
thus no need to charge interest. However, over time the need arose to use mutuum 
for commercial purposes and to charge interest. If such an obligation to pay inter-
est was to be imposed, it had to take place by virtue of a verbal contract, namely a 
stipulatio. The stipulatio as contract was separate from that of mutuum.
64 667  emphasis added
65 997 3 SA 67 (C)
66 6  emphasis added
67 Para 5  For a discussion of this aspect of the case, see Cilliers 007 The Taxpayer 84  According to Van der 
Walt et al Introduction to the Law of Property 5, the value of property is generally regarded objectively
68 Western Bank Ltd v Registrar of Financial Institutions 975 4 SA 37 (T) 43; “Loan” LAWSA XV paras 5 
and 68
69 Another form of a money-lending contract, nexum, was also initially available under Roman Law  under 
this formal contract, the debtor gave himself as hostage to the creditor for payment of the debt  If the 
debtor defaulted, the creditor could inter alia enslave him or even execute him  Not surprisingly, it fell 
into disfavour and disappeared  Thomas, Van der Merwe & Stoop Historical Foundations of South 
African Private Law  ed (000) 69
70 Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (990) 53-54; 
Thomas et al Historical Foundations 69-70
4 STeLL LR 008 
In modern South African law, a loan for consumption is arguably not a real 
contract anymore, but rather a consensual one.7 Once the loan contract has been 
validly concluded, it gives rise to obligations on the side of both the lender and the 
borrower. The first obligation relates to the obligation to transfer the loan capital. 
This entails, on the passive side of the obligation, that the lender is under a duty 
to give both possession of, and title to, the loan capital to the borrower.7 On the 
active side of the obligation, the borrower has the right to receive possession of, 
and title to, the loan capital. Thus, on transfer of the loan capital, the borrower 
becomes the owner73 of the loan capital and has all the usual entitlements associ-
ated with ownership:74 She may consume it, part with it, et cetera.
In Cactus Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue75 it was 
held that the lender’s only duty was the one described above. In particular, the 
SCA was of the opinion that the lender has no continuous duty to keep the 
loan capital available during the period of the loan. On the active side of the 
obligation, this means that the borrower only has a contractual right to receive 
possession and title to the money lent. Her “right” (or rather entitlement) to 
retain and use the loan capital is not derived from a continuous contractual 
obligation, but from her ownership of the loan capital.
The second obligation flowing from a monetary loan entails the borrower’s 
duty to return, at the expiry of the loan period, an amount equal to the loan 
capital, with the lender’s corresponding right to receipt thereof.76
Modern loan contracts often give rise to a third obligation, namely the 
obligation to pay interest.77 Despite such an obligation being commonplace, it 
is not one of the essentialia of a loan contract.78 It has been said that an inter-
est-free loan constitutes a “continuing donation” of the interest.79 However, 
it is doubtful whether this is correct in those cases where the parties never 
contracted that interest would be charged. Although a donation at common 
law includes the waiver of a right, there can be no waiver, and thus no dona-
tion, if no right existed in the first place.80
7 Thomas et al Historical Foundations 7, LAWSA XV para 53, discussed in Zimmermann Obligations 
65 n 66
7 LAWSA XV para 7
73 “Loan capital” in this context does not refer to coins and notes only, but may also refer to, for example, a 
bank account  In such a case, the “loan capital” will not be a thing and it is problematic to talk of “owner-
ship” thereof  However, for the sake of convenience, this is done throughout this paper
74 Welkom Bottling Co (Pty) Ltd v Belfast Mineral Waters (OFS) (Pty) Ltd 968  SA 6 (O) 64, Cactus 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 999  SA 35 (SCA) 3 and Commissioner 
for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 955 3 SA 93 (A) 30  See also LAWSA XV para 7
75 999  SA 35 (SCA)
76 LAWSA XV para 73
77 See Cilliers 007 The Taxpayer 87-88 for the different ways in which the obligation to pay interest is 
sometimes described
78 NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC; Deeb v ABSA Bank Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of 
SA Ltd 999 4 SA 98 (SCA) paras 7 and 8; LAWSA XV para 5  
79 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Berold 96 3 SA 748 (A) 753F-G; Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service v Woulidge 00  SA 68 (SCA) para 0  The SCA in Brummeria para  also referred 
to Berold’s case  
80 Coronel’s Curator v Estate Coronel 94 AD 33  The first two cases mentioned above dealt with s 7(3) 
of the Income Tax Act 58 of 96, which seeks to tax the founder of a trust if she has made a “donation, 
settlement or similar disposition” to the trust  It is arguable that an interest-free loan is a “disposition” that 
may in any event trigger s 7(3)  Refer in this regard to the judgement by Davis J in Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service v Woulidge 000  SA 600 (C) where he held, at 60, that the failure to charge 
interest was a “disposition”
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7  The argument in Brummeria
It will now be considered whether the taxpayers in Brummeria did 
indeed acquire any property that could be included in their gross income. 
It must be remembered that the Commissioner argued that the “benefit 
of the rights to interest-free loans” for the relevant periods constituted a 
“right which had an ascertainable monetary value and which accrued to 
the companies”.8
In rejecting the Commissioner’s argument, Goldblatt J stated the 
following:8
“The ‘rights’ which the Commissioner alleges the appellants obtained are not rights which can 
be transferred or ceded. The only right which the appellants obtained was the right to retain the 
money lent until the happening of certain predetermined events. This ‘right’ has no independent 
existence separate from the actual liability to repay the monies borrowed and clearly has no 
money value.”
On the other hand, Cloete JA held that “the right to retain and use loan 
capital for a period of time, interest-free”, had an objective value and thus 
constituted an amount that accrued to the taxpayer companies.83 In response 
to the above statement by Goldblatt J, Cloete JA held:84
“The Tax Court also held that the benefit85 included by the Commissioner in the companies’ gross 
incomes had no existence independent from the liability to repay the monies borrowed; that it could 
not be transferred or ceded; and that it ‘clearly has no money value’. This reasoning loses sight of the 
fact that if a right has a money value– as the right in question did, for the reasons I have given– the 
fact that it cannot be alienated does not negate such value.”
It is submitted that Goldblatt J’s reasoning is to be preferred to that of 
Cloete JA. In advancing this argument, the phrase “the right to retain and 
use loan capital for a period of time, interest-free”, which was used by the 
SCA to describe the amount that was “gross income” of the taxpayers, will be 
analysed in order to determine whether it refers to property that accrued to or 
was received by the taxpayers.
7 1  The right to transfer of the loan capital and the transfer of the 
loan capital
upon conclusion of a loan contract, the borrower becomes the holder of a 
right to transfer of the loan capital.86 This is a personal right and property of 
the borrower. When the lender discharges her duty by transferring ownership 
in and possession87 of the money, the borrower becomes the holder of the real 
right of ownership, which is also property.88
8 Para 9 of the SCA judgement
8 Para 3 of the Tax Court judgement
83 Para  of the SCA judgement
84 Para 9 of the SCA judgement
85 Note that Goldblatt J did not use the word “benefit”, but rather “‘the rights’”
86 See 6 above
87 Often, of course, the lender will discharge her duty by way of electronic transfer, rather than delivering 
coins and notes  In such an event, it is problematic to refer to “possession” of the money  See also n 17 
above
88 Arguably, both the personal right and the real right of ownership have patrimonial value
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However, as explained earlier, not every acquisition of physical control over 
money or money’s worth constitutes a receipt for purposes of the definition of 
“gross income”. It was accordingly held in Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd89 that in the case of a loan, the loan capital is not 
regarded as being “received” by the borrower, since at the exact moment that 
she obtains possession of the loan capital, she is placed under a simultaneous 
duty to repay it. The fact that the borrower becomes the owner of the loan 
capital does not change this.
Genn’s case was not considered by the SCA in MP Finance Group CC v 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Services.90 In that case the appellant 
was obliged to repay money that was obtained from investors under an illegal 
pyramid scheme. The Court considered the meaning of the word “receive” in 
the context of the illegality of the investments and held that such money was 
“received” by the appellant, even though it was under an obligation to repay 
the money due to the illegality of the investment.9 The Court, however, did 
not consider the meaning of the word “receive” in the context of the argument 
that the investments were loans and Genn’s case was thus never discussed.9 
Accordingly, this case does not overrule the principle in Genn in respect of the 
receipt of loan capital. Furthermore, since the principle in Genn was accepted 
by the SCA in Brummeria,93 which was decided after MP Finance Group CC, 
it must be accepted that Genn’s principle is still applicable in respect of loan 
contracts.
Although Genn’s case specifically excludes acquisition of the loan capital 
as a “receipt”, there is little doubt that the acquisition by the borrower of the 
right to receive transfer of the loan capital will, for the same reason, not be 
regarded as an “accrual”.94 Thus it was held in ITC 177895 that an interest-free 
loan made to the taxpayer did not accrue to the taxpayer. More generally, 
it was held in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Felix Schuh (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd96 that a “loan” does “not figure in … the computation of the respondent’s 
receipts and accruals”.97
89 955 3 SA 93 (A) 30
90 007 5 SA 5 (SCA)  Genn’s case was, however, considered in the Tax Court judgement of that same case 
reported as ITC 1789 67 SATC 05
9 Para 
9 See para 7 where the possibility was raised that the investments were loans  See also ITC 1789 67 SATC 
05 where the tax court expressly limited Genn’s case to loans.
93 Para 9 of the SCA judgement
94 See O’Donovan “Receipts, Accruals and Double Taxation” 1969 SALJ 78 where the author queries 
whether, in light of Genn’s case, “receipts” as an independent basis of assessment is still a possibility, 
since a taxpayer would invariably become entitled to an amount (in other words it will accrue to her) 
either before or simultaneously with receipt of the amount  But see “Are Income Receipts Taxable” 
97 The Taxpayer 5 5 where the author is doubtful as to whether this will always be the case  
See further ITC 1789 67 SATC 05 confirmed by the SCA in MP Finance Group CC v Commissioner 
for South African Revenue Services 007 5 SA 5 (SCA)  The reasoning in the latter two cases is 
criticised in Meyerowitz “Receipts or Accruals: Two Independent Concepts?” 2007 The Taxpayer 8 
– 84
95 66 SATC 334 para 46
96 994  SA 80 (A)
97 8  emphasis added
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Genn’s principle was accepted by both the Tax Court98 and the SCA99 in 
Brummeria. It is therefore clear that the “right to retain and use loan capital, 
interest-free” does not refer to either the borrower becoming entitled to trans-
fer of the loan capital, or the actual receipt of the loan capital.
7 2 The “right” not to pay interest
As noted above,00 charging interest is not one of the essentialia of a mon-
etary loan. A lender will only have a right to interest if the parties agreed 
thereto. In the absence of such agreement, it would be fallacious to state that 
the lender has a duty not to charge interest, or, conversely, that the borrower 
has the “right” not to pay interest. The “benefit” of not having to pay interest 
is neither a personal right nor any other form of property.0 It thus cannot 
constitute an amount for purposes of the definition of “gross income”, irre-
spective of whether or not it has value.0
7 3 The “right” to retain and use the loan capital
The last question that has to be considered is whether the “right” to use and 
retain the loan capital is property that accrues to03 the borrower.
As explained earlier,04 the lender’s only duty under a loan contract is to 
transfer possession of, and title to, the loan capital to the borrower. Importantly, 
the lender does not have a continuous contractual duty to make the loan 
capital available (nor does the lender have any other continuous contractual 
duties). Conversely, the borrower does not have a continuous personal right 
to retain and use the loan capital. This “right” merely refers to entitlements 
of the borrower by virtue of her right of ownership of the loan capital. As 
already mentioned,05 the borrower becomes the owner of the loan capital and 
thus enjoys all the usual entitlements of an owner, including the entitlements 
to possession and use.
The borrower becomes owner of the loan capital and holder of these enti-
tlements upon transfer of the loan capital. However, for the reasons set out 
above,06 this event is not recognised as an accrual or receipt for purposes of 
98 Para 5 of the Tax Court judgement  Goldblatt J held that the obtaining of the loan capital by the borrower 
is a receipt, but not “gross income” since it is of a capital nature  As support for his view, he refers to 
Genn’s case  However, it seems that the reasoning in Genn’s case was not based on the argument that the 
loan capital was capital, but rather that the borrower did not “receive” it
99 Para 9 of the SCA judgement
00 See 6 above
0 Goldblatt J clearly did not consider this to be a subjective right  See para 6 of the Tax Court judgement 
where he referred to it as a “benefit” and para 13 where he put the word “rights” in inverted commas  
Compare this on the other hand with Cloete JA’s judgement where he referred to it interchangeably as a 
“right” and a “benefit”
0 For a contrary view, compare Meyerowitz Meyerowitz on Income Tax 006-007 ed (007) para 6 47  
03 Since there cannot be physical control over this “right”, it arguably cannot be received by the borrower  
In the discussion below, only the possibility of an accrual of this right will thus be discussed
04 See 6 above
05 6 above
06 7  above
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the definition of “gross income”. Moreover, no other event takes place that 
can be regarded as an acquisition (accrual) of property in the form of a right 
(an amount) by the borrower.07 In other words, neither the accrual, nor the 
amount, requirement for “gross income” is met.
Had a lender been under a continuous contractual duty, there might have 
been room for an argument that the borrower acquired a personal right against 
the lender on a continuous basis and that there was thus an accrual of an 
amount (assuming such personal right would have had objective monetary 
value) on a continuous basis. However, as has been repeatedly argued in this 
paper, the lender has no such continuous duty.
The argument that there was no acquisition of a right after transfer of the 
loan capital was also the basis of Goldblatt J’s reasoning in the Tax Court. At 
several places in his judgement he makes it clear that the entitlement to use 
the loan capital is not a distinct subjective right that accrued to the taxpayers. 
Had the taxpayers used the loan capital to produce non-capital accruals or 
receipts, these could amount to “gross income”. But they had not. He thus 
held as follows:
“[T]he appellants were entitled to use the monies received by them [for income-producing purposes] 
… [T]he monies were not used for these purposes and the Commissioner has assessed them on the 
basis of notional income received from the use of this money. This clearly is not permissible and such 
notional income is not income within the definition of s1 of the Act.”08
And:
“What is of value [to the borrower] is the possession of the money borrowed. Possession of money 
cannot in itself earn income as it is merely an income producing tool which may be used by the pos-
sessor to earn income but need not be so used. What the Commissioner has attempted to do is to treat 
the opportunity to earn income as income. This merely has to be stated to be rejected as not falling 
within the definition of ‘gross income’.”09
Also at para 15:
“If a contractual aspect of such a loan [ie that no interest is charged] makes it less or more valuable to 
the borrower, either at the date advanced, or at a later date, this simply affects the potential utility of 
this capital receipt in his hands, but does not in itself increase or decrease his gross income.”0
The SCA never dealt with the issue as to how the “right” to retain and use 
the loan capital can be regarded as property that was acquired by the taxpay-
ers after receipt of the loan capital in any great depth. Instead, once the Court 
concluded that this “right” had objective monetary value, it simply accepted 
that it was an amount that accrued to the taxpayers on a seemingly continuous 
basis.
07 That is, unless the loan capital is used to generate further receipts and accruals
08 Para  of the Tax Court judgement  emphasis added
09 Para 3 of the Tax Court judgement  emphasis added
0 emphasis added  See Brincker Taxation Principles of Interest and Other Financing Transactions 4 ed 
(007) A-9 for a short discussion of this paragraph
 Based on the fact that an amount was included in the taxpayers’ gross income on a yearly basis, it must 
be accepted that the “right” to retain and use the loan capital accrued (and would carry on accruing) on a 
continuous basis throughout the term of the loan
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The SCA dealt with Goldblatt J’s argument as follows:
“The Tax Court held that the companies received no monies on loan which were used to produce any 
income, and that the Commissioner had therefore assessed the companies on notional income…. The 
Commissioner taxed the companies on the basis of the benefit consisting in the right to use the loans 
without having to pay interest on them. That benefit remained, whatever the companies did or did not 
do with the loans. Furthermore, no question of double taxation would arise, as suggested on behalf 
of the companies, if the amounts lent were to have been invested so as to produce interest – in such 
a case there would be two separate and distinct receipts or accruals, each of which would fall to be 
included in the companies’ gross incomes.”
However, this statement does not explain how the benefit accrues, ie on 
what basis it can be said to be (continuously) acquired. It also does not explain 
how this “benefit”, which is not property in itself, can be an amount.3 For 
these reasons, Goldblatt J’s argument is to be preferred.
7 4 The right to occupy a property for free
Lastly, notice should be taken of the following statement by Hefer JA in 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd:4
“The first and basic proposition is that income, although expressed as an amount in the definition, 
need not be an actual amount of money but may be ‘every form of property earned by the taxpayer, 
whether corporeal or incorporeal, which has a money value including debts and rights of action…’ 
This proposition is obviously correct … It is hardly conceivable that the legislature could not have 
been aware of, or would have turned a blind eye to, the handsome profits often reaped from com-
mercial transactions in which money is not the medium of exchange. Consider eg the many instances 
of valuable property changing hands, not for money, but for … remuneration for services in the form 
of free or subsidised housing … These are only a few of the many possible illustrations that readily 
come to mind and which, as we know, have not been overlooked by the legislature.”5
The question is whether the phrase emphasised above provides support for 
the argument that if an employee’s right to free housing may constitute “gross 
income” of the employee, then a borrower’s right to borrow money interest-free 
may similarly be regarded as “gross income” of the borrower. Such an argument 
would overlook an important distinction between an interest-free monetary loan 
and a right to occupy a property at no consideration, as explained below.
The contract to provide free accommodation can probably be classified as 
an innominate contract.6 In terms of such a contract, ownership of the prop-
erty is not transferred to the employee.7 Instead, the employee’s entitlement 
to occupy arises by virtue of her personal right against the other party.
 Para 8 of the SCA judgement  emphasis added
3 See also the argument by Cilliers 007 The Taxpayer 88 that based on the SCA judgement double taxa-
tion is, at least economically, a real problem
4 990  SA 353 (A)  
5 363I-364C  emphasis added
6 The employee is obliged to give a counter-performance, being the rendering of services, in return for 
free housing  In De Jager v Sisana 930 AD 7 and Jordaan NO and Another v Verwey 00  SA 643 
(e) it was held that such an arrangement would not be classified as a lease (since the employee’s counter-
performance is not in the form of payment of money or fruit), but rather as an innominate contract  For a 
discussion of these cases, see Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (004) 6 – 70
7 Although these arrangements are not “leases” as discussed above, they share a number of similarities 
with lease contracts  It should be noted that a lessee usually does not have real rights in respect of the 
leased property  But see Badenhorst et al Property 430 – 43 for some exceptions to this usual position
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An important distinction between a monetary loan and this type of innomi-
nate contract is that the counter-party has a continuous contractual obligation, 
whereas a lender only has a passing obligation.8 The employee thus becomes 
continuously entitled to the personal right against the counter-party. Provided 
that this right is of a non-capital nature and has objective monetary value, it is 
arguably an amount that accrues to the employee on a continuous basis.9
Finally, it should be borne in mind that even before the enactment of the 
Seventh Schedule to the Income Tax Act,0 which deals with fringe benefits, 
income in respect of employment services was defined more widely than other 
forms of income. For example, in the 97 Act “gross income” was defined 
as “the total amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person …and 
includes …the estimated annual value of any quarters or board or residence or 
any other benefit or advantage of any kind granted in respect of employment, 
whether in money or otherwise…”. The role of legislation as regards tax 
benefits received in respect of employment is also specifically acknowledged 
by Hefer JA’s words “have not been overlooked by the legislature” at the end 
of the paragraph from People’s Store quoted above.3
8  Future application of the SCA judgement
There is little doubt that the SCA decision will apply to similar benefits 
arising from other interest-free loans, provided of course that they are of a 
non-capital nature. This proviso will exclude these benefits in the majority of 
cases. In other cases, the taxpayers may try to challenge aspects (of similar 
scenarios) not considered in the Brummeria case by, for instance, advocating 
the adoption of a particular method of valuation.
But of even greater significance is the possibility that the SCA decision 
may find application beyond interest-free loans. One such area is employment 
benefits that are not taxable under the Seventh Schedule. There may be a risk 
that these (non-capital) benefits could now be taxed under paragraph (a) or (c) 
of the definition of “gross income”, even if they do not represent property of 
the employee. In this regard, Cloete JA said:
“[The seventh schedule] was inserted into the Act not because [fringe] benefits are not otherwise 
taxable, but to put beyond doubt what benefits are taxable and, equally importantly, to determine how 
their value is to be assessed for the purpose of calculating the tax to be deducted by an employer from 
an employee’s remuneration”.4
8 In the same manner in which a lessor has the continuous duty to provide undisturbed use  See “Lease” 
LAWSA XV XIV para 6 in respect of this duty  The Appeal Court also made this distinction between 
a lease and a monetary loan in Cactus Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 999 
 SA 35 (SCA)  See also LAWSA XIX para 7 for the distinction between passing and continuous 
obligations  
9 The initial transfer of possession of the leased thing is not regarded as a “receipt”  Refer in this regard to 
the (obiter) view of the Appeal Court in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 955 3 
SA 93 (A) 30
0 Act 58 of 96
 S 6 of Act 4 of 97
 emphasis added
3 See, however, para 7 of the SCA judgement in this regard
4 Para 7 of the SCA judgement  emphasis added
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9  Conclusion
The SCA in Brummeria held that “the right to retain and use the loan 
capital, interest-free” was a valuable right that accrued to the taxpayers and 
formed part of their gross income. In reaching this decision, the SCA accepted 
the principle in Lategan and People’s Store that “every form of property” of 
a non-capital nature that is acquired or received by a taxpayer, constitutes 
gross income.
Yet the Court never (expressly) considered whether this particular “right” 
was indeed susceptible to classification as property, or whether it was acquired 
on a continuous basis throughout the duration of the loan. Rather, once it 
had decided that this “right” had objective monetary value, the SCA simply 
accepted that this meant that all the requirements5 for “gross income” had 
been met.
The SCA judgement creates a possibility that, in future, it could be con-
tended that any benefit, irrespective of whether or not it is property, could 
constitute an amount. What such a “benefit” may entail (apart from the fact 
that it must have objective economic value) is not explained in the judgement, 
leading to considerable uncertainty. If this analysis is correct, the decision by 
the SCA in Brummeria may indeed be the most important tax case in the past 
30 years.
SUMMARY
In Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd 007 6 SA 60 
(SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal held that when an interest-free loan is made, the “right” to retain 
and use the loan capital interest-free constitutes an amount which accrues to the taxpayers and forms 
part of their “gross income” for purposes of the Income Tax Act 62 of 1958 (if it is of a non-captial 
nature). In response to this judgement, it is argued that only property accruing to a taxpayer is capable 
of constituting such an amount, and of thus forming part of gross income. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that the “right” to use the loan capital on an interest-free basis cannot be equated with “property” 
that is acquired by the borrower during the currency of the loan. Such a “right” can thus not be said 
to constitute an amount, and it follows that it cannot accrue for purposes of the Act’s definition of 
“gross income”.
5 As explained, the non-capital nature of the “right” was never in issue
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